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As a result of 18 years of sustained combat operations across the globe, the ability 
of the Department of Defense (DoD) to maintain the readiness of its force has been severely 
impacted. Consequences of congressional budgetary actions that have delayed and limited 
funding to support the DoD have compounded the readiness problem. In a statement to the 
Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff United States Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford said, “Eight years of continuing 
resolutions and the absence of predictable funding has forced the department to prioritize 
near-term readiness at the expense of modernization and advance capability development” 
(Garamone, 2017a). His statement provides direct insight into the main problem facing the 
DoD as it tries to modernize the force and improve readiness. 
Over 30 Continuing Resolutions (CR) have been passed since fiscal year (FY) 
2010, and with the passing of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, federal defense 
funding has faced a decade of financial uncertainty resulting in ever changing long-term, 
strategy-driven funding plans (McClanahan, Saturno, Lynch, Heniff, & Murray, 2019). 
These congressional actions have created an overarching financial environment that 
directly impacts how budget requests are prepared, submitted, and ultimately executed. 
The BCA is set to  expire in FY 2021; but, as shown by the funding shortfall for DoD long-
term planning forecast by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
(OUSD [C]) (2016a) and depicted in Figure 1, the DoD will continue to feel the effects of 
the challenging fiscal climate. These effects on the DoD have a direct impact on the Marine 
Corps’ ability to conduct long-term planning and fix its short-term problems. 
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Figure 1. Defense Budget Picture FY 2017. Adapted from  
OUSD [C] (2016a). 
Another factor affecting the Marine Corps’ fiscal problems is the planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) system, which is the budgeting process 
for the DoD. Within this budgeting cycle, at any time three budgets are being managed by 
the DoD, which adds to the complexity when under constant fiscal uncertainty. For the 
Marine Corps, programming and budgeting falls under the purview of the Department of 
the Navy (DoN), and must be reviewed and approved by the DoN, which in itself creates 
additional friction such as differing long-term objectives regarding force structure or 
shipbuilding plans that support Marine Corps operations. As the Marine Corps tries to 
conduct long-term planning and programming, the budget seldom reflects the requirements 
since it is continually adjusted by other priorities within the DoN and even at the DoD 
level. 
All of these factors play a role in the Marine Corps’ ability to budget and execute 
resources to be a force in readiness. According to the readiness section of the DoN FY 
2018 Budget Highlights Book, the FY 2018 budget continued the efforts of the FY 2017 
budget to close the gap on readiness and provide a forward postured Marine Corps that is 
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ready to respond to crisis. The main account that it focuses on for achieving this goal, 
Budget Activity (BA) 1 Operating Forces, falls under the Operations and Maintenance, 
Marine Corps (OMMC) appropriation. This account provides funding to employ and 
sustain expeditionary forces, conduct training exercises, and support base operations for 
installations around the world. It receives the largest portion of the OMMC budget, as seen 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. FY 2018 Active Marine Corps O&M Funding. Source: 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy [Financial 
Management and Comptroller], (2018). 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As the strategic environment has moved into an era of great power competition, it 
is vital that the Marine Corps utilizes its scarce resources effectively and efficiently in order 
to prepare for the future conflicts that it will face. Even though congressional actions 
continue to limit the financial flexibility of the DoD, each Service within the DoD 
continues to under-execute its total obligation authority (TOA) resulting in expired funding 
that can no longer be used to support their warfighters. The Marine Corps has not fully 
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assessed the impact of congressional actions on its resource allocation. Through analysis, 
the Marine Corps may find it has more flexibility to assume risk in certain programs while 
funding others. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary research question: How have the fiscal constraints imposed on the DoD 
through the BCA affected Marine Corps budget requests and subsequent executions? 
Secondary research questions: What were the outyear total budget projections for 
the DoD prior to, and as a result of, the BCA? What actions did the BCA and subsequent 
modification require? What is the delta between the allocations the Marine Corps received 
and subsequently executed in each fiscal year for its OMMC appropriation from 2009 
through 2018? Have Continuing Resolutions impacted the Marine Corps’ execution? How 
has the Marine Corps used the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds to lessen 
the impact of the budget cap? 
D. SCOPE 
According to the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) study on defining 
military readiness, no authoritative list exists that defines which budget line items 
contribute to supporting military readiness (Rumbaugh, 2017). Although the Marine Corps 
receives and utilizes multiple appropriations to support its readiness, it would be difficult 
to conduct a thorough analysis across numerous funding streams that have various life 
cycles. Even analyzing one appropriation proves itself difficult as seen in an analysis 
conducted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2011 in which it could not 
establish a statistical relationship between unit readiness and Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) spending (CBO, 2011). 
A proxy must be determined for readiness in order to analyze the effects of 
congressional budgetary actions. Because the Marine Corps continues to face its own 
unique readiness problem, this project focuses on the O&M appropriation as its proxy for 
readiness, which focuses on the Marine Corps’ active force O&M accounts that are one-
year appropriations. According to Rumbaugh (2017), since O&M accounts contain funding 
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for activities that do not contribute to readiness of the active force, an analysis of BA 1 
Operating Forces is the refined proxy and the report concentrates on the narrow concept of 
readiness so no other appropriation besides OMMC is part of the analysis. The analysis 
covers both the budgeting and execution of BA 1 Operating Forces, OMMC from FY2009 
through FY2018. This time range will provide the ability to compare budgeting and 
execution of FYs prior to the enactment of the BCA with FYs under the BCA. This time 
range is also limited due to the availability of reliable data. Recommendations for possible 
improvement is limited to any inferences gained through comparative analysis of data. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
In order to analyze the impacts of congressional budgetary actions on the Marine 
Corps, the data used has to be accurate and reliable. The Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Comptroller’s unclassified open source website has adequate data from 2009 to 
2018 for both budgeting and execution of BA 1 Operating Forces, OMMC. For budgeting, 
the Operation & Maintenance Programs (O-1) report provides the relevant budget data for 
baseline and OCO funding. In order to determine a specific fiscal year’s budget request 
and amount enacted we must use two different fiscal year O-1 reports. For example, to 
determine the budget request for FY2015, the FY2015 O-1 report is used. The FY2016 O-
1 report provides the amount enacted for FY2015. 
For execution, the OUSD [C] quarterly O&M budget execution reports provide data 
for budget execution for a given fiscal year. The 4th quarter report for a fiscal year provides 
the net TOA and total obligations for BA 1 Operating Forces, OMMC, which include 
baseline, OCO, statutory adjustments, and reprogramming actions. Even though the net 
TOA is different from the enacted amount, it still serves as a basis for comparing execution 
against budget. Since there is no reliable way to separate out between baseline, OCO, and 
reprogramming funding under total obligations, the given values will be used.  
Recording data using Microsoft Excel facilitates its proper organization and allows 
for manipulation in order to conduct relevant analysis. The workbook is broken down into 
budget requests, enacted budget amounts, budget execution, funding caps based on the 
BCA and subsequent BBAs, and CR length in days for each fiscal year from 2009 to 2018. 
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Having these categories allows comparison to see what the deltas are between the Marine 
Corps’ BA 1 Operating Forces, OMMC budget request and enacted TOA, with 
adjustments, and budget execution. It also allows comparison between length of CRs and 
budget execution to see if there is a statistical relationship between the two. 
In order to conduct specific analysis for values across multiple fiscal years, the 
amounts must be converted into FY19 constant (real) dollars to ensure accurate 
comparison. To convert the amounts into constant dollars, we use the DoD deflator values 
as shown in Table 1 and the formula found in the FY19 DoD Green Book; Constant $ = 
Current $ 
FYdeflator
 * (100). 
Table 1. DoD Deflator. Adapted from OUSD [C], (2019a). 



















The BCA of 2011 is a federal law which was enacted to control the U.S. 
government’s budget and spending. Its intent was to cap the government discretionary and 
non-discretionary spending for 10 years from 2011 to 2021. The caps set by the BCA were 
revised upward several times, limiting their effectiveness. 
Since the implementation of the BCA of 2011 and frequent CRs dating prior to the 
BCA of 2011, the DoD, Marine Corps and political and industry leaders alike have in one 
voice pointed out the impact these legislative actions have had. These stakeholders noted 
the effects of the legislation on modernization programs, training, and operations across 
the services. The Marine Corps’ ability to remain a technically adept force capable of 
winning a near-or peer-to-peer conflict is directly tied to the same effects.  
For instance, in a statement delivered to the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
on September 2016, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Neller, stated 
that budget cuts had impacted the Marine Corps and had come with a cost to meet 
operational requirements. Not too long after, both former Defense Secretary James Mattis 
and General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified in front of the 
same committee as the issue of budget caps and fiscal uncertainty still impacted the  
Marine Corps’ readiness and the DoD as a whole. General Mattis voiced at this June 2017 
hearing that the DoD needed several years to rectify the impact of sequestration and voiced 
the urgency of the issue: “Let me be clear: As hard as the last 16 years of war have been 
on our military, no enemy in the field has done as much to harm the readiness of U.S. 
military than the combined impact of the BCA’s defense spending caps, worsened by 
operating for ten of the last 11 years under CRs of varied and unpredictable duration” 
(McGarry, 2019, p. 3). 
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B. BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 
On August 2, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law the BCA of 2011 
(Pub.L. 112–25), also known as “An Act to provide for budget control”. The BCA 
contained several critical components in order to try and bring the budget under control. 
First, there was the increase of the U.S. debt-ceiling in order to prevent a crisis and debt 
default. Second, the law imposed caps to both defense and nondefense discretionary 
spending for ten fiscal years, from FY 2012 through FY2021 (S.365—112th Congress, 
2011). In addition, the spending caps of the discretionary spending were enforced by 
sequestration to cut funding across discretionary spending to the limit specified by law in 
the event that spending caps were violated. This meant that a sequester was to take effect 
to reduce the deficit if at least $1.2 trillion was not enacted by January 15, 2012 (S.365—
112th Congress, 2011) and continues through fiscal year 2021 when distributed equally 
across defense and non-defense spending with some exemptions (House Committee on the 
Budget, 2011). 
The first automatic enforcement after the BCA of 2011 was enacted took effect in 
January 2012. This automatic revision of the BCA reduced the discretionary budget 
authority limits for defense spending by $54 billion in FY 2013 and by $55 billion in FY 
2014 through FY 2021. The amounts for the BCA and Bipartisan Budget Acts (BBA) 
spending limits on National Defense discretionary base budget authority came from CRS 
report No. R44039 as seen on Table 2. Table 2 depicts the spending limits in billions of 
nominal dollars as amended in shaded and bold and excludes OCO. 
  
9 
Table 2. BCA Limits on National Defense (050) Discretionary Base 
Budget Authority. Source: McGarry (2019). 
National 
Defense (050) 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Budget Control 
Act of 2011 




555 492 501 511 522 535 548 561 575 589 
American 
Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 2012 
555 518 497 511 522 535 548 561 575 589 
Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 
2013 
555 518 520 521 523 536 549 562 576 590 
Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 
2015 
555 518 520 521 548 551 549 562 576 590 
Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 
2018 
555 518 520 521 548 551 629 647 576 590 
Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 
2019 
555 518 520 521 548 551 629 647 667 672 
 
C. STATUTORY CHANGES MADE TO THE BCA OF 2011 
To modify or repeal any aspect of the BCA of 2011, new legislation must be 
enacted. Up to five statutory changes have been made to the BCA since 2012. The changes 
were to the spending limits or enforcement procedures initially listed in the BCA for each 
year from FY2013 through FY2021 (House Committee on the Budget, 2011). 
The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) as well as all four Bipartisan Budget 
Acts (BBAs) were enacted to raise the spending limits instituted by the BCA of 2011. 
These bills were all introduced by the House of Representative unlike the BCA itself which 
was introduced by the Senate. A budget resolution must be passed by both the House of 
Representative and the Senate before it is signed into law by the president. The fact that 
Congress could not pass a budget on time post-BCA and the pressure of the DoD to raise 
the caps are the contributing factors to these statutory changes.  
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1. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012 (Pub.L. 112–240) 
This ATRA was enacted on January 2, 2013 (H.R. 8—112th Congress, 2011). 
Signed by President Barack Obama, the ATRA of 2012 primarily made permanent 
extension and modification of the 2001 and 2003 tax relief and extended the 2009 tax relief 
and made permanent alternative minimum tax relief (H.R. 8—112th Congress, 2011). 
Also, other temporary tax provisions to include the individual tax and business tax were 
extended for a period of one to five years (H.R. 8—112th Congress, 2011). Pertaining to 
the BCA of 2011, this bill addressed the activation of the BCA of 2011’s budget 
sequestration provisions. It reduced cuts to the defense accounts originally set by the BCA 
of 2011 by $24 billion and delayed the start of the FY 2013 sequester from January to 
March of that fiscal year (Driessen & Lynch, 2019). The ATRA of 2012 impacted the 
discretionary budget authority limits under the BCA of 2011 for FY 2013 and FY 2014. 
The discretionary caps in FY 2013 were set at approximately $518 billion for defense 
activities and $484 billion for nondefense activities, and the FY 2014 discretionary caps 
were set at $497 billion for defense activities and $469 billion for nondefense activities. 
2. The Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2013 (Pub.L. 113–67) 
This law was enacted on December 26, 2013 (H.J.Res. 59—113th Congress, 2013). 
Signed by President Barack Obama, the BBA of 2013 is also referred to as the Murray-
Ryan agreement. Because the 2011 budget cut greatly affected the DoD and FY 2013 
encountered a sequester that started on March 3, 2013, one of the primary purposes for the 
BBA of 2013 was to find a solution for the DoD in order to better support DoD personnel 
and their mission. Also known as the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014, the 
BBA of 2013 was a federal statute concerning spending and the budget in the United States 
(H.J.Res. 59—113th Congress, 2013), which raised the sequestration caps for FYs 2014 
and 2015 for both defense and nondefense discretionary spending each by about $22 billion 
and $9 billion, respectively, for discretionary spending (Driessen & Lynch, 2019), in return 
for extending the imposition of the caps into fiscal years 2022 and 2023. In effect, raising 
the caps, but extending them longer into the future. Following the enactment of this law, 
the discretionary caps in FY 2014 were set at approximately $520 billion for defense 
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activities and $492 billion for nondefense activities, and the FY 2015 discretionary caps 
were set at $521 billion for defense activities and $492 billion for nondefense activities. 
3. The BBA of 2015 (Pub.L. 114–74) 
This law was enacted on November 2, 2015 (H.J. 1314—114th Congress, 2015). 
Signed by President Barack Obama, this bill was initially used with the intent to pass three 
proposals that were distinct and unrelated (H.J. 1314—114th Congress, 2015). These 
proposals were: the BBA of 2015, the Trade Act of 2015 and a bill regarding administrative 
appeal of IRS determinations (H.J. 1314—114th Congress, 2015). Ultimately, the bill was 
used to raise the government debt ceiling and raise the government spending levels by $25 
billion in FY 2016 for both defense and nondefense discretionary spending, and by $15 
billion in FY 2017 for both defense and nondefense discretionary spending (Driessen & 
Lynch, 2019). Following the enactment of this law, the discretionary caps in FY 2016 were 
set at approximately $548 billion for defense activities and $518 billion for nondefense 
activities, and the FY 2017 discretionary caps were set at $551 billion for defense activities 
and $519 billion for nondefense activities. Also, nonbinding spending targets for OCO for 
FY 2016 and FY 2017 were established.  
4. The BBA of 2018 (Pub.L. 115–123) 
This bill was enacted on February 9, 2018 (H.R. 1892—115th Congress, 2018). An 
amendment to this bill: “Bipartisan Budget and Appropriation Reform Act of 2018” was 
introduced to Congress on November 29, 2018 but was not enacted (H.R. 7191—115th 
Congress, 2018). Signed by President Donald Trump, the BBA of 2018 is also known as 
“Further Extension of Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018; Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2018; Sustain Care Act of 2018; Honoring Hometown Heroes Act” 
(H.R. 1892—115th Congress, 2018). This bill increased the discretionary spending limits 
for defense and nondefense spending for FY 2018 by $80 billion and $63 billion, 
respectively, and for FY 2019 by $85 billion and $68 billion, respectively. The 
discretionary caps in FY 2018 were set at approximately $629 billion for defense activities 
and $579 billion for nondefense activities, and the FY 2019 discretionary caps were set at 
$647 billion for defense activities and $597 billion for nondefense activities. This bill also 
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prevented a government shutdown in FY 2019 and allowed the funding of the federal 
government until March 23, 2018.  
5. The BBA of 2019 (Pub.L. 116–37) 
This law was enacted on August 2, 2019. Signed by President Donald Trump, this 
bill increased the discretionary spending limits for defense and nondefense spending for 
FY 2020 by $90 billion and $78 billion, respectively, and for FY 2021 by $81 billion and 
$72 billion, respectively. In other words, following the enactment of this law, the 
discretionary caps in FY 2020 were set at approximately $667 billion for defense activities 
and $622 billion for nondefense activities, and the FY 2021 discretionary caps are 
scheduled to be $672 billion for defense activities and $627 billion for nondefense activities 
(the highest yet) (Driessen & Lynch, 2019). The bill also suspended the debt limit for those 
fiscal years until July 31, 2021 and modified budget enforcement procedures. In addition, 
the bill specified limits for OCO funding and included provisions for designations of funds 
for OCO.  
D. CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS 
A CR or continuing appropriations as defined by the U.S. Senate, is a “legislation 
in the form of a joint resolution enacted by Congress, when the new fiscal year is about to 
begin or has begun, to provide budget authority for Federal agencies and programs to 
continue in operation until the regular appropriations acts are enacted” (U.S. Senate, 2019). 
The Continuing Resolution Authority gives Marine Corps commands an authorization to 
continue with daily operations before an appropriation bill is signed and an authorization 
is passed down to Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs and Resources for execution.  
Data regarding the amount of days the DoD was under a CR came from CRS report 
No R45870 as seen on Figure 3. Figure 3 depicts the large disparity of days under a CR 
between FY 2010 to FY2018 compared to FY 2002 to FY 2009. The DoD has started the 
FY under a CR every year since FY 2011. The many CRs in FY 2011 made FY 2011 the 
first year since FY 2002 that the CRs went into the third quarter lasting 196 days. CRs are 
supposed to be temporary and are designed to give decision-makers more time to sign the 
appropriation bills that are often used to prevent government shutdowns.  
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Figure 3. Days Under a Continuing Resolution: Department of 
Defense. Source: Towell, McClanahan, & Roscoe (2019). 
As General Robert Neller stated to the Senate Committee on Armed Services in 
2016, “The fiscal reductions and budget instability of the past few years have negatively 
impacted our current and future readiness” (Neller, 2016, p. 3). The budget instability 
mentioned here is not only due to the effect of the BCA of 2011, but also to the multiple 
CRs the DoD has faced over the years. One of the major issues with CRs is that although 
CRs give DoD agencies such as the Marine Corps the latitude to continue normal 
operations and maintenance until an appropriation bill is signed, no new initiatives or 
programs can be executed. These have impacted Marine Corps procurements such as the 
Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) that in turn end up impacting OMMC. “On June 14, 2013, 
Marine leadership put the MPC program on ice due to budgetary pressures but suggested 
the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources 
might be more favorable” (Feickert, 2019, Summary). 
This issue was addressed by the CRS on August 2019 which released the “Defense 
Spending Under an Interim Continuing Resolution: In brief.” The CRS assessed the impact 
on DoD and concluded that “published reports on the effect of CRs on agency operations 
typically provide anecdotal assertions that such funding measures increase costs and reduce 
efficiencies” (Towell et al., 2019), but that those accounts do not support their information 
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with data and therefore make it systematically impossible to analyze the effects of CRs 
(Towell et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the CRS looked also at research conducted by the 
RAND Corporation in 2017. RAND concluded after looking at certain criteria that it “did 
not find strong evidence… indicating that CRs are generally associated with delays in 
procurement awards or increased costs” (Towell et al., 2019), but that, given the limitations 
inherent in statistical analysis, it could not use the results perceived to eliminate the 
manifestation of negative impacts imposed by CRs (Towell et al., 2019).  
E. SUMMARY 
The BCA of 2011 had five statutory changes that altered the BCA from its original 
form and intent. Over the span of seven years (2012–2018) there were five statutory 
changes that amended and increased the caps for both discretionary and nondiscretionary 
spending for every year since 2012. 
Figure 4 shows actual and projected outlays by budget enforcement category from 
2001 to 2024 projections. It depicts a slight decrease in defense and non-defense 
discretionary spending after the BCA of 2011 was enacted. However, before the end of the 
covered period (2021), there is an increase in both defense and non-defense discretionary 
spending if not higher, matching what is was in 2011. The several amendments to the BCA 
of 2011 made it less effective in the sense that it did not meet its initial intent every year 
after its enactment.  
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Figure 4. Outlays by Budget Enforcement Act Category, FY2001-
FY2024 (in billions). Adapted from McGarry (2019). 
The BCA impacted the Marine Corps by limiting the amount the service could 
spend and frequent CRs made executing those lower amounts more difficult. The varied 
and unpredictable fiscal environment of CRs have become the direct link between budget 
requests and subsequent executions. There has been uncertainty and chaos in the Marine 
Corps spending significantly impacting the Marine Corps’ readiness which is why General 
Mattis advocated stable budgets for the DoD to work with (Garamone, 2017b).  
Although the cuts to the defense budget have tapered off, the damage caused by 
successive cuts, but also the uncertainty of future years’ funding levels and delays in 
current year funds have left its marks on modernization programs, training, and operations. 
In fact, years of sequestration actually caused the need for a larger budget (Perez, 2018). 
In order to reverse this damage, not only must the Marine Corps consider whether its budget 
request formulation process and funds execution needs revision, but it must also truly 
understand the impact of budget caps in real terms. This will put budget and financial 
officers in a better position to advise decision-makers, refine how they prepare budget 
requests, and implement plans to efficiently execute their funding.  
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This chapter provides the findings from the compiled data in an effort to provide 
insight into answering the research questions. The analysis begins with the budgeting 
perspective at the DoD level and then dives into the Marine Corps’ BA 1 Operating Forces 
account from before the BCA, FY 2009 to 2011, and post BCA FYs 2012 to 2018. The BA 
1 Operating Forces OMMC account represents a proxy for readiness to shed some insight 
into how funding for readiness may have changed during the 10-year period. Next, the 
analysis looks at the execution of the data by the Marine Corps and its relation to the DoD 
and budget caps. The data presented is from the total DoD discretionary budget, the 
OMMC appropriation level, and BA 1 Operating Forces level to see if there is any 
relationship regarding cuts/caps on funding and their effects. 
A. BUDGET REQUESTS 
1. DoD 
In order to understand the fiscal climate and long-term implications on planning, 
we need to look at the top line DoD budget requests and allocations. From FY 2012 to FY 
2018 there had been 5 different budget deals that affected the funding caps regarding 
discretionary funding for the DoD. In FY 2013, sequestration kicked in and significantly 
reduced the budget for the DoD from the prior FY. Figure 5 shows how the enacted 
amounts for the DoD, which include base and OCO funding, in nominal and real (FY 2019) 
terms have tracked together over the past 10 years. From FY 2009 to 2010 the DoD had a 
slight increase in its enacted amounts and from 2010 to 2015 the DoD enacted amounts did 
not increase in either nominal or real values. FY 2016 was the first year to see an increase 
in both real and nominal values in terms of the enacted amounts that were similar to prior 
BCA growth. In real terms, the FY 2017 increase in enacted amounts was less than the 
prior year by 0.22 percent. 
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Figure 5. FY to FY Changes in DoD Enacted Amounts. Adapted 
from OUSD [C] (2019a) 
Table 3 displays the President’s Budget (PB) submission for FY 2011 through 2018 
with proposed out-year topline figures for the base budget. Data for FY 2009 and 2010 data 
long-range planning data is unavailable. As the available data shows, beginning with FY 
2012, the initial year after the enactment of the BCA, the topline figures for the DoD have 
decreased year over year with its long-range planning. Looking at the FY 2011 PB 
submission, the DoD anticipated requiring $635 billion in FY 2016 to meet its objectives, 
however, the actual PB submitted for FY 2016 was $101 billion below that amount. The 
largest difference in long-range planning can be seen in FY 2015 with a delta of $120 
billion from what was forecasted back in FY 2011 to what was actually submitted in FY 
2015. The FY 2015 PB submission is almost 20 percent less than what was forecasted to 
be required back in FY 2011. Even though the FY 2018 delta is small compared to the 
other FYs, the PB amount submitted was above the BCA enacted cuts in hopes that 
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Table 3. DoD Proposed Outyear Topline Figures for the Base 
Budget. Adapted from OUSD [C] (2010c, 2011c, 2012b, 2013c, 2014c, 

















FY 2011 PB  566 582 598 616 635   
FY 2012 PB  553 571 586 598 611 622  
FY 2013 PB   525 534 546 556 567 579 
FY 2014 PB    527 541 551 560 569 
FY 2015 PB     496 535 544 551 
FY 2016 PB      534 547 556 
FY 2017 PB       524 557 
FY 2018 PB        575 
Delta*  -13 -57 -71 -120 -101 -98 -4 
*Initial outyear minus actual PB submission 
 
Figure 6, from the FY 2019 budget request, shows how the BCA and BBA caps has 
hindered the DoD from receiving the funding it forecasted based on the FY 2011 Future 
Years Defense Program (FYDP). The figure also shows how the DoD is finally starting to 
close the gap on its shortage beginning in FY 2018. Figure 6 along with Table 3, shows the 
effect on the DoD topline when it comes to planning long-range strategies and what is 
appropriated by Congress.  
 
Figure 6. Defense Base Budget. Source: OUSD [C] (2018). 
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Because of the congressional legislative actions that have limited the topline of the 
DoD, the DoD has used its OCO funding to offset the caps imposed by the BCA and BBAs 
to cover some of its baseline requirements. OCO has continually been used as a means to 
fund baseline requirements since OCO does not fall under the constraints of the BCA. The 
continual use of OCO funds to offset base budget caps highlights a huge problem within 
the DoD fiscal environment. These limitations have resulted in the abuse of OCO to fund 
large portions of long-term baseline requirements and do not align with the purpose of why 
OCO was introduced in FY 2011. Figure 7 displays the percentage of the budget authority 
for the DoD that is OCO funding. The percentage trends downward after the enactment of 
the BCA but still remains a significant portion of the total budget authority of the DoD.  
 
Figure 7. OCO Percentage of DoD Budget Authority.  
Adapted from OUSD [C] (2019a). 
Figure 8 shows the percentage change from FY to FY of OCO funding. This graph 
trends in the same way as Figure 5 except for FY 2018 where the BBA was enacted which 
increased the base cap to $600 billion which decreased the amount required for OCO 
resulting in a negative 22 percent change. With the drawdown of military forces from 
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2011, funded by OCO, a downward slope in 
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military exercises and operations overseas, OCO funded some military operations 
including the terrorism threat in Afghanistan and Yemen (Torreon & Plagakis, 2019). 
 
Figure 8. Percentage Change in OCO Amounts. Adapted from 
OUSD [C] (2019a). 
2. Marine Corps 
To see how the BCA of 2011 and its statutory changes imposed on the DoD affected 
Marine Corps budget requests, a bar chart was used to compare OMMC BA 1 Operating 
Force PB request, enacted amount net of statutory adjustments, and the TOA net of 
reprogramming to see how each one of them fluctuated pre-BCA and years following the 
BCA. Pre-BCA years in Figure 9 show that the enacted amount is drastically above the PB 
requested amount which is due to how OCO was reported. In FY 2009 through 2011 OCO 
was not included in the PB request and was added as a statutory adjustment to the enacted 
amounts. FYs 2012 through 2018 do not have any drastic difference in values between the 
three variables. In FY 2013, even though the amount enacted was higher than requested, 










2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Percentage Change in OCO Amounts
OCO Nominal OCO Real
22 
 
Figure 9. Marine Corps BA 1 Operating Forces. Adapted from 
OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015b, 
2016b. 2017c, 2019b). 
Table 4 displays the amounts and relative size of the Marine Corps’ BA 1 Operating 
Forces budget request compared to that of the DoD topline. It also shows what the BA 1 
Operating Forces budget request is compared to the overall OMMC budget request. The 
Marine Corps’ BA 1 Operating Forces budget request takes up the majority of the OMMC 
request but is only around one percent of the overall DoD budget request. FY 2009 through 
2011 only includes base funding which is why they are lower than the other FYs. Also, the 
increase in BA 1 as a percentage of the DoD topline beginning in FY 2012 is due to the 
amount of OCO enacted for the BA 1 account since it is used to support the deployed forces 
conducting contingency operations. As seen from Figure 9 and Table 4, there is a 
significant drop in overall funding in more recent years at all three levels from FY 2015 to 
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Table 4. BA 1 Operating Forces Percentage of OMMC & DoD. 
Adapted from OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015b, 








BA 1 % 
OMMC 
BA 1 % 
DoD 
2009 4.3 5.6 515 76% 0.83% 
2010 4.4 5.5 534 80% 0.82% 
2011 4.4 5.6 549 78% 0.79% 
2012 7.7 9.5 671 81% 1.15% 
2013 8.2 10 614 82% 1.33% 
2014 7.2 8.9 615 81% 1.17% 
2015 6.0 7.4 575 81% 1.04% 
2016 5.8 7.2 585 81% 1.00% 
2017 6.4 7.8 589 82% 1.08% 
2018 6.6 8.1 639 82% 1.04% 
 
Figure 10 displays the percentage change from FY to FY of BA 1 budget requests 
and DoD budget requests. This line chart shows a similar trend in both variable except in 
FY 2013 and 2014 where the percentages deviate from each other. In FY 2013 the 
percentage change for the DoD from FY 2012 is negative 8.49 percent while the Marine 
Corps’ BA 1 percentage change from the same period is 6.03 percent. In FY 2014 the 
percentage change for the DoD from FY 2013 to 2014 is 0.16 percent while the Marine 
Corps’ BA 1 percentage change is negative 11.94 percent. 
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Figure 10. Percentage Change in Budget Requests. Adapted from 
OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015b, 
2016b. 2017c, 2019b) 
Figure 11 displays the percentage change from FY to FY of BA 1 and DoD enacted 
amounts along with the BBA budget cap adjustments beginning in FY 2012. This line chart 
is very similar to Figure 10 except in FY 2010 and 2011 the percentages are closer in line 
with each other. The huge drop in DoD enacted amount after FY 2013 is the BCA effect. 
FY 2013 saw the BCA spending limit in effect and the enforcement of sequestration. The 
variation in percentages in Figure 11 compared to Figure 10 are due to statutory 
adjustments made by Congress in the budgeting process. Looking at the BBA data, the 
budget cap from FY 2016 to FY 2017 only had a slight increase compared to larger 
increases to the DoD and BA 1 account. Even though in FY 2014 the BBA had a slight 
increase in the budget cap, BA 1 had a large decrease in its enacted amount. 
Figure 12 displays the percentage changes from FY to FY of BA 1 budget request 
in nominal and constant FY 2019 values. This chart shows that when adjusted for inflation, 
the values for the percentage changes from year to year are lower than the nominal rates. 
For example, in FY 2015, the percentage change from the PB request for BA 1 in nominal 
terms was negative 16.91 percent, however, when put into FY 2019 values, the real value 
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less buying power than what was originally budgeted for. The effects of the BCA can be 
seen in the percentage change from FY 2013 to FY 2014 in BA 1 as it reaches nearly 
negative 15 percent. 
 
Figure 11. Percentage Change in Enacted Amounts for BA 1 and 
DoD. Adapted from OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 
2014b, 2015b, 2016b. 2017c, 2019b). 
 
Figure 12. Percentage Changed in Enacted Amounts for BA 1. 
Adapted from OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 
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Figure 13 shows the percentage of the Marine Corps’ BA 1 PB request of OCO 
compared to the total budget request over the last 10 FYs. The figure also shows the 
percentage of the budget request for the DoD that is OCO. In comparison, both lines have 
similar trends but the overall percentage of OCO for the Marine Corps’ BA 1 is consistently 
higher which is in line with what the account supports. Both lines trend downward after 
the enactment of the BCA which is interesting considering OCO amounts do not fall under 
BCA caps. 
 
Figure 13. OCO Percentage of DoD Budget Authority. Adapted from 
OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015b, 
2016b. 2017c, 2019b). 
Figure 14 shows the percentage change from FY to FY of OCO funding budget 
requests for both BA 1 and the DoD. This chart has similar trends compared to Figure 11 
which is the percentage change of enacted amounts for BA 1 and DoD topline. The 
variables become inverse of each other after the BCA enactment from FY 2012 to FY 2016. 
In FY 2017 they come closer to alignment with each other and the percentages continue to 
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Figure 14. Percentage Change in OCO Amounts. Adapted from 
OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015b, 
2016b. 2017c, 2019b). 
In summary, the figures and tables in this chapter demonstrate that congressional 
budgetary actions have led to inconsistent and untimely funding which has impacted the 
DoD and Marine Corps through their requested, enacted, and executed appropriations. As 
seen throughout the chapter, funding for the DoD from FY 2012 through FY 2016 slowly 
declined, due to BCA effects, until it hit the lowest amount in the decade in FY 2016. This 
led to the DoD facing a readiness and modernization problem due to the lack of fiscal 
certainty and the ability to adequately fund a long-term defense strategy. This has also 
forced the services to use OCO funding to fund baseline requirements.  
B. BUDGET EXECUTION 
With so much uncertainty facing the execution year of the PPBE process, the actual 
amounts budgeted for will more than likely be different from what is appropriated and will 
also vary by what is reprogrammed or adjusted during the year. The difference between the 
amounts that the Marine Corps budgeted for, received, and adjusted during each FY are 
seen in Table 5. The amounts enacted compared to the requests vary slightly from year to 
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the amount requested. Also, the enacted amounts in the most recent years is consistently 
less than the amounts requested. The adjustments to the TOA throughout the fiscal year 
may indicate that, the Marine Corps reprogrammed funding from other accounts knowing 
that it could execute the money prior to expiration. As the figure displays, the pre-BCA 
FYs have a larger amount of adjustments made which increased the net TOA for the BA 1 
account compared to the post-BCA FYs. This may be an indicator that with tighter fiscal 
constraints and uncertainty the Marine Corps’ ability to adjust funding during the FY may 
be limited since the enactment of the BCA. However, the larger amount of TOA in pre-
BCA FYs can also be associated to the use of OCO funding.  FY 2013 shows the effect of 
sequestration which resulted in a reduction of over $600 million to the account.   
Table 5. BA 1 Budgetary Changes. Adapted from OUSD [C] 




The delta between the allocations the Marine Corps received and subsequently 
executed in each fiscal year for its BA 1 Operating Forces OMMC appropriation from FYs 
2009 through 2018 is depicted in Figure 12. The line chart displays the unobligated amount 
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amount is seen in FY 2009 which is before the enactment of the BCA. However, in FY 
2014 the unobligated is very close to FY 2009 levels. 
 
 
Figure 15. Delta between OMMC BA 01 Operating Forces Net TOA 
and Execution. Adapted from OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 
2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015b, 2016b. 2017c, 2019b). 
Figure 16 shows that there is no correlation between high unobligated balances and 
a lower appropriation the following year. If Y is the FY, series 1 through 9 identify each 
FY from FY 2009 through FY 2017. In FY 2012 (series 4) for example, the unobligated 
TOA is the highest of the covered period (FYs 2009—2017). The enacted amount FY 2013 
(series 4), however, is not the lowest of the covered period (FYs 2010—2018), suggesting 
that there is likely no correlation between the high unobligated balance (FY 2012) and the 
enacted amount the following year (FY 2013). A correlation of the unobligated TOA at 
year Y to the enacted amount with statutory adjustment at year Y +1 gives a value of -
0.069; a negative correlation between the two variables. This confirms that there is no 
practically significant correlation between the high unobligated balance on year Y and a 
lower appropriation the following year.  
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Figure 16. Relation between OMMC BA 01 Operating Forces 
Unobligated TOA and the Following Year Enacted Amount. 
Adapted from OUSD [C] (2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b, 
2015b, 2016b. 2017c, 2019b). 
To determine if CRs have impacted the Marine Corps’ ability to execute its funding 
based solely on data. A correlation analysis was conducted to see if any statistical 
relationship exists between BA 1 Operating Forces OMMC unobligated TOA for each FY 
and the amount of days under a CR for that FY.  
  
31 
Table 6. BA 01 Operating Force OMMC Unobligated TOA and 
Number of Days under CR. Adapted from Towell et al., 2019, OUSD [C] 









2009 0 2,262 
2010 79 4,647 
2011 196 15,665 
2012 83 18,539 
2013 176 7,823 
2014 108 3,498 
2015 76 9,961 
2016 78 15,621 
2017 217 15,642 
2018 173 20,202 
 
Table 6 data was used to conduct a correlation test in Excel. The correlation test between 
OMMC BA 01 Operating Forces unobligated TOA against the number of days under CR 
during FYs 2009 through 2018 gave a correlation of 0.515. Based on the result obtained, 






























A. BUDGET REQUESTS 
This chapter discusses the findings from Chapter 3 and the implications they may 
have in answering the research questions. The discussion begins with the implications of 
the congressional actions from the budgeting perspective at the DoD level and then dives 
into the Marine Corps’ BA 1 Operating Forces account starting pre-BCA, FYs 2009 to 
2011, then post BCA FYs 2012 to 2018. Finally, the discussion focuses on the effects of 
the BCA on budget execution at the Marine Corps’ BA level. 
1. DoD 
According to the DoD PB FY 2019 request (OUSD [C], 2018), in order to meet the 
full requirements of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the DoD required funding from 
the enacted FY 2011 budget levels, adjusted for inflation. Obviously, this has failed to 
occur since the enactment of the BCA as seen by Figure 6. With the passing of the 2018 
BBA, the base budget levels have begun to reach the required levels for the DoD to get the 
funding it requires to implement the NDS. However, since the passing of the BCA, the 
capped funding received by the DoD led to a loss of over $400 billion in capability as 
determined through the PPBE process and outlined within the FYDP. Table 3 displays this 
capability loss as seen through the deltas between FY 2011 PB and each subsequent PB 
through FY 2016. Even after the passing of the BCA, a huge delta exists between the FYDP 
from the FY 2012 PB compared to the FY 2017 PB request. 
Since FY 2011, the DoD did not receive an increase in its base budget in real terms 
until FY 2016. This implies that Congress expected the DoD to continue its advance 
forward to meet the NDS without additional funding to enhance capabilities and increase 
readiness of the force. Without additional funding, the DoD had to choose between 
maintaining the readiness of aging equipment or investing into future technologies and 
weapon systems to fight tomorrow’s battles. The tough decisions made by the DoD and 
Services resulted in serious readiness issues and was brought to the attention of Congress 
on multiple occasions as addressed in the introduction and background chapters. However, 
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it was not until the BBA of 2018 that progress was made to fully fund the baseline 
requirements of the DoD which have fallen behind for at least six fiscal years. 
In order to mitigate the funding caps established by the BCA, the DoD utilized 
OCO funding to cover its critical base budget shortfalls. This practice has received negative 
attention in Congress, as it is viewed as a work around to the BCA caps since it does not 
fall under BCA legislation. Nonetheless, the DoD continues to use this strategy since it still 
remains underfunded for its base budget requests, albeit at a lower percentage of the total 
budget compared to FYs prior to FY 2018. Even though the DoD is still engaged in limited 
contingency operations, the amount of OCO requested is smaller because the base budget 
funding has increased to meet the baseline requirements of the DoD.  
2. Marine Corps 
How does the Marine Corps, the United States expeditionary force in readiness 
prepares itself without the proper resources? Again, as identified in previous chapters, 
Marine Corps leadership has asked this question at the highest levels of government and 
will continue to ask until it receives the appropriate amount of funding to accomplish its 
mission in providing a force in readiness for the nation. As previously discussed, this 
project uses the BA 1 Operating Forces account as a proxy for the readiness of the Marine 
Corps. By using this proxy, some insights can be drawn into why the Marine Corps faces 
readiness problems.  Similar to the DoD, the enacted amounts for the BA 1 account began 
to decrease in FY 2012 and continued to decrease all the way through FY 2016. It was not 
until FY 2017 that the Marine Corps began seeing an increase in funding for its BA 1 
account. Again, similar to the DoD, the multiple years of funding decreases forced the 
Marine Corps to prioritize between readiness and modernization.  Even though the Marine 
Corps has the ability to adjust and reprogram funding between accounts, it must make a 
tradeoff since it has a limited budget. Since the enactment of the BCA, the Marine Corps 
has reprogrammed funding into the BA 1 account to increase its net TOA; however, it has 
not done so in significant amounts and is more than likely still underfunded compared to 
the FY 2011 FYDP for that account. 
35 
The Marine Corps’ BA 1 is the largest OMMC account and is typically 80 percent 
of the OMMC budget request. This percentage has held constant prior to and after the 
passing of the BCA along with OMMC as a percentage of the DoD topline. Since these 
percentages have held constant, it demonstrates that as funding decreases at the higher DoD 
level, the decrease in funding is seen at the service level and within their individual 
accounts. The budget requests for the DoD and the Marine Corps’ BA 1 have followed 
similar trends in percent changes during the BCA, except for FY 2014 where the Marine 
Corps had a large decrease in its BA 1 budget request compared to an almost zero percent 
change in the DoD request. Further analysis is required to see if the Marine Corps’ topline 
numbers dropped significantly during FY 2014 and if cuts were made across the board. 
The Marine Corps’ BA account funds overseas operations, so it makes sense that a 
majority of its funding comes from OCO. During the final years of combat operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, OCO made up almost 45 percent of the BA 1 account. This makes 
sense, since the account directly supports overseas missions. As the drawdown from those 
operations occurred, the amount of OCO as a percentage of the BA 1 account slowly 
diminished and decreased down to roughly 15 percent in FY 2016. It increased in FY 2017 
but in FY 2018 decreased again. It is interesting to note that the Marine Corps’ percentage 
change in OCO from FY 2013 to FY 2014 compared to DoD is drastic (almost 35 percent 
decrease) while the DoD was at approximately zero percent change. With a large decrease 
in its OCO funding, the baseline requirements that it was funding with OCO may have 
been set aside to result in compounding the readiness issue along with being part of the 
longest war. 
B. BUDGET EXECUTION 
The actual amounts that the Marine Corps budgeted for, received, and adjusted 
varied every FY from 2009 to 2018 as shown in Table 5. With so much uncertainty facing 
the execution year of the PPBE process and the congressional actions that continue to limit 
the Marine Corps’ flexibility, it is hard to fathom that the Marine Corps continues to under-
execute its TOA. This under-execution in the BA 1 account although not directly linked to 
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the enactment of the BCA is still a loss of funds that prevents proper support of the 
operating forces.  
Findings from chapter 3 suggest that the enacted amounts vary slightly from year 
to year except in FY 2012, where the change was drastic. The enacted amount is in fact 
over $400 million less than the amount requested. This does not have any tangible 
explanation, as the BCA limits on National Defense discretionary base budget authority 
did not kick in until FY 2013.  Also, post BCA, the enacted amounts are mostly less than 
the requested amounts a situation which can be justified by the BCA limits, thus forcing 
Congress to stay within a cap.  Table 5 also display a net TOA for the BA 1 account higher 
than the enacted amount from every FY from FYs 2009 to 2018, except for FY 2013, where 
it is significantly lower. This can be explained by the 2013 sequestration which reduced 
over $600 million to the account. It is noticeable, however, that the net TOA is significantly 
higher than the enacted amount pre-BCA, close to $700 million, but not so much post-BCA 
where it is only about $100 million. Again, as previously indicated, this is likely due to the 
use of OCO funds. Through reprogramming, however, the Marine Corps may have found 
a flexibility in assuming risk in certain programs while funding others. This is beneficial 
because it allows the Marine Corps to execute most of its BA 1 funding prior to funds 
expiring.  
The data shows that the fiscal constraints imposed on the DoD through the BCA 
affected the Marine Corps budget executions positively. The net TOA were significantly 
closer to the enacted amount post-BCA.  
Looking at the delta between the allocation the Marine Corps received and 
subsequently executed for its BA 1 account, it does not follow the same pattern as the TOA 
less enacted amounts. This makes sense. The enacted amounts are in fact subject to 
congressional actions every year for the BA 1 account. Net TOA less enacted amounts 
showed a clear difference between pre-BCA and post-BCA and how drastic the 
sequestration impact was. However, Net TOA less execution (Figure 15) does not show 
any pattern. The Net TOA less execution or the unobligated amount is lower in FY 2014 
compared to FY 2013 when there was a sequestration.  
37 
This result shows that the BCA of 2011 alone did not have any impact on the Marine 
Corps budget execution when looking at the BA 1 Operating Force, OMMC proxy. The 
delta between the allocations the Marine Corps received and subsequently executed in each 
FY for its OMMC appropriation from 2009 through 2018 varied between $2.6 million in 
FY 2009 and $20.2 million in FY 2018, which are both the lowest and the highest 
unobligated amount, respectively. Looking at it in terms of percentage, this is only 0.03% 
and 0.3% respectively for FY 2009 and FY 2018 of the net TOA.  
It could be hypothesized that there is a correlation between high unobligated 
balances and lower appropriation the following year. However, the findings show that there 
is no correlation between the two (Figure 16). The appropriation passed by Congress every 
year does not look at the remaining balance of the previous year. In fact, the Marine Corps 
through the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), gives its recommendation regarding 
how to plan and allocate its resources.  
Analyzing tables and the associated findings shows that CRs have not impacted the 
Marine Corps’ budget execution. There was a moderate correlation between the number of 


























This project’s primary purpose focused on the impact of the BCA on the Marine 
Corps’ budget requests and executions. The project reviewed data from the past ten FYs 
(2009 to 2018) at the DoD and Marine Corps BA level for budgeting and at the Marine 
Corps BA level for execution. The primary focus on the analysis used quantitative methods 
to gain insight into the effects of the BCA. The methods included statistical comparisons 
between DoD and Marine Corps budgeting changes pre- and post-BCA years, and also 
looked at possible correlations between unobligated balances and the length of CRs. 
In an attempt to help answer the research questions as addressed in the Introduction, 
a summary of the all of the legislative actions that occurred in the past ten years was 
outlined. This facilitated the comparison of fiscal constraints put on the DoD to how they 
affected the Marine Corps. It also provided insight into the fiscal uncertainty of which the 
DoD has been operating under. 
The quantitative analysis began with looking at the DoD budget requests over a ten-
year period. Analysis showed a large loss of capability over the FYDP from both FY 2011 
and FY 2012 PB requests. This loss in baseline funding is directly related to the BCA-
imposed funding caps. It was not until FY 2016 that the enacted amount of baseline funding 
began to increase. The four-year decrease in funding had negative effects on the ability of 
the DoD to properly conduct long-term planning. 
The analysis continued by looking at the Marine Corps BA level and its budget 
requests over the same ten-year period. Comparison between the Marine Corps and DoD 
showed a similar pattern regarding percentage changes across the FYs as the amounts 
decrease and increased with each new legislation. Slight variation occurred between FY 
2013 and FY 2014, however, the rest of the period remained consistent. The amount of 
OCO as a percentage of the BA 1 account consistently decreased, which is consistent with 
the decrease in overseas operations and not the funding caps imposed by congressional 
actions. 
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Finally, the analysis looked at the Marine Corps’ BA 1 budget execution. The 
unobligated balances for each FY pre and post-BCA were used in correlation tests against 
both the length of the CRs for each FY and the enacted amounts for each following FY. 
The first test showed no correlation between the unobligated balance and the following 
years enacted amount while the second test showed moderate correlation between the CR 
length and unobligated balance.  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
After conducting the initial research into this topic, it is evident that a deeper 
analysis should be conducted to determine the root cause of budget variations at the Marine 
Corps BA level. The following areas may help explain in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms why the variations exist. 
First, a look into the POM cycle and the decisions made by Marine Corps leadership 
on areas that assumed risk by cutting funding and the reasons behind these decisions based 
on imposed cuts by the DoN. This would provide insight into the methodology used by the 
Marine Corps in its tradeoff decisions regarding limited budget authority. This could be 
done at the BA 1 Operating Forces level and compared to other BA accounts. 
Second, a deeper analysis into the impact of CRs on budget execution may provide 
insight into the real cost of not passing a budget on time. Statistics may show how much 
of the unobligated funding for each FY is tied to the budget not passing in a timely manner. 
Third, further analysis must be done to measure the impact of fiscal constraints by 
correlating funding levels with measures of readiness.  
Finally, further research into the Marine Corps’ use of OCO may provide insight 
into what actual baseline requirements benefited from it. With the current projection of 
OCO getting smaller while base budgets increase, analysis may indicate risk for the Marine 
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